WHY THERE IS A SOCIAL PROBLEM WITH IMMIGRATION

1. Conditions of Social Work in a Migration Society

The considerations following are restricted to the ongoing discussion on the economic, social and legal framework conditions within which we can talk critically and constructively as well about perceivable tasks, challenges and limitations of social work in dealing with the issue of migration. The perspectives developed here perceive social work as a tool of migration management embedded in its triple mandate (help/advocacy, control, professionalism).

1.1. Addressees of Social Work

Social work with Immigrants means in most of the Member States of the European Union to work with

– refugees

– members of the foreign workers who entered Europe in the 1960´s and 197o´s,

– immigrants from former colonies, and

– lower strata of the workforce of Member States entering the Union in 2005.

From a sociological point of view immigration involves different social strata with different, even competing economic and social interests. The population of immigrants is in any case heterogenous.

Against the prevailing, right-wing-populist narrative that immigration could be rendered as an immigration of unqualified „have-nots" into social welfare systems of the EU´s member states, we can observe quite the opposite: since academic sociology is tackling the issue of migration each and every model of migration is based on empirical findings that most migrants, including refugees and labor migrants are part of the middle classes in their countries of origin. Basically only people deriving from middle classes in their country of origin are able to raise the funds to organise the escape from a war-zone, an ecological disaster or simply from the periphery of the capitalist world system.

This is already indicated by the fact that the process of migration is costly and protracted, while it is based only partly on realistic assumptions to find access to the lower segments of Europe´s labour market(s). On the one hand we see, not only after 2015/2016, a population of people fleeing from civil wars in Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq, claiming to be prosecuted. However, as Afghanistan is already labeled to be a „safe country", the recognition rate in asylum procedures involving citizens from Afghanistan is meanwhile dropping significantly. On the other hand, we see a growing group of immigrants, especially from Africa, who have little chance of being granted asylum or entering the formal European labour market and who in fact no longer claim to be refugees in the sense of the geneva convention. Rather, it is argued by migrants themselves, media, civil society, and social

services working for/with immigrants, that migrants try to escape from precarious economic conditions in their home country and are in search of a better life.

Accordingly, there is a high degree of ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion in the wording and linguistic treatment of the migration process itself. Permanently we hear talking about „refugees", which is by any means a technical, legal term, but in fact we see a growing number of immigrants who are just in search of prosperity. However, a asylum procedure has to be based on an investigation procedure and a case assessment ads well within an administrative procedure. Only after a formal completion and positive decision of the authority in charge one can speak of a formal „refugee" status.

In the public discourse, which is characterised by simplifications and a pervasive moralising of economic conflicts, a misunderstanding of the mode of capitalist regulation, of economic exploitation, and the nature of the capitalist, bourgeois state as well, the complexity of immigration is by far underestimated. In fact, any decision to migrate regularly has several implications. It opens up a perspective of absolute social upward-mobility and relative social downward mobility. It offers a perspective to remit income to the family of origin while refraining from any investment in the foundation of a petit bourgeois existence within the host society. It puts the family of origin under pressure because the decision to co-finance the journey/the transfer is linked to the impossibility to dispose on the resources already spent. The decision to migrate transforms social relationships, because family members, networks, or even villages (have to) expect remission payments, putting pressure on the migrant who is realising step by step after arrival that the chances of employment and promotion are far from as good as had been hoped.

As a matter of fact each migration creates a series of liabilities and psychological pressure. Immigrants have to pay back their debts to smugglers and trafficking agencies, but also have to remit money to their family, neighbours or village. They have to prove to be a man capable of caring for its family. Against that background of complex obligations Andrea di Nicola and Gianpaolo Musumeci revealed in their seminal work on trafficking („Confessioni di un Trafficante di Uomini") that irregular and forced migration are not only risky but also quite costly, ending up in a debt spiral. It is risky because women could be forced into prostitution while men could be forced into the informal labour market. It is expensive, which is why migration is regularly associated with paying off debts to smugglers for years.

Migration has regularly ambivalent effects: an anchor person can obtain a residence permit in the host country as refugee or migrant worker and earn a regularly low income. If he/she ist sending remittances back this will be not only lead to a lack of investment in social upward mobility in the host society but also in a lack of social, cultural and economic capital, shaping the social status. One the one hand sending remittances will improve the standard of living and the market activties in the country of origin, but on the other hand it will also generate detrimental effects in the countries of origin, because the „brain

drain" of young, educated men, the majority of migrants are male, leads to a loss of productivity. Often emigration countries loose relevant parts of a whole generation. The exodus after the financial meltdown in 2008, the rescue of banks, institutional investors, insurances, and speculators of all kinds led to a loss of multilingual, above-average qualified young workers in Portugal (250.000), Spain (350.000), or Greece (450.000), being described as brain drain, loss of productivity/creativity and „human capital". Recently tens of thousands of people living in southern Italy, which is affected by enormous youth unemployment, have set off for Germany. Seen from this angle every emigration has profitable and adverse effects in the country of emigration and the host society as well.

Having said that, migration generates not only effects in the households of emigrant families and the economy of the country of origin. It also generates expenses and returns in the host countries, what could be easily observed in the European immigration societies. As a matter of fact the European host countries are in need to stabilise the demographic balance on the labour market and the generational contract the social insurance system is based on. Apart from the growing share of older people entitled to pension transfers, European welfare states have also to cover the growing need for personnel in long-term care. In both cases the problem solving is done by „importing" people.

For these reasons, the EU member states, deliberately labeled as „immigration societies" by political elites, have planfully to invest in immigrants, allow for their social integration and inclusion in order to make them a part of the productive labour force. Therefore, migration is more than ever a question of migration management.

It should be noted in advance preemptively that of course the term „middle class" indicates a broad container concept including the condition to be illiterate, informally employed, and being nevertheless middle class compared to the rest of the country of origin. However, once having entered the host society, immigrants, disregarding their potential to be employed - for example in apprenticeship training, leading to manual occupations - are regularly referred to the lower social strata and are therefore facing significant difficulties on labour, housing and educational markets.

As a result they start from a lower class position beneath their established level of education and training in their country of origin. For this reason social work with immigrants means under most circumstances working with people which are institutionally referred to the milieus of the underclass. In a way, social work functions as an agency that helps to overcome the disappointments associated with that referral and is intended to give migrants the factual compulsion to start afresh in the lower classes of the host country.

Seen from that angle social work with migrants is by no means an independent discipline, rather intertwined with other experts in the realm of migration management. Moreover, social work with migrants is a field in which regular methods of social work are to be applied, supplemented by specific cultural and language skills, and above, all: legal know-

ledge. By the same token social work is by no means a „leftist", society-transforming discipline. Rather, it fulfills an economically and socially necessary task.

This aspect is an essential one seen from the perspective of the triple mandate of social work. Distinguishing between help, social control, and the maintenance of professional standards social work claims a political mandate, rendering itself as a human rights discipline. However, this „political" mandate, if at all, is focusing on the conditions, requirements, and tasks of capitalist markets. Above all, immigrants are, from the perspective of captialist system reproduction, perceived as workforce, consumers, tax payers, and social security contributors.

1.2. The (impossible) Task of Social Work

Therefore, in contrast to multiculturalist perspectives, which prematurely stylise migrants as victims, whose special religious or cultural identities require special measures and exempt legal positions, social work with migrants must aim to help immigrants as soon as possible to achieve a citizenship status, a regular income to secure theirlivelihood, adequate housing, and a minimum level of social integration and inclusion as well. The goal of social work must be normalisation and, as far as possible, social advancement from the assigned lower class position.

Once having arrived in the country of destination, immigrants are as indicated confronted with the harsh realities of neoliberal societies, their deregulated and flexible labour markets, lousy jobs, and low income. Consequently, immigrants are facing the same problems as the lower classes in the respective host society.

Counterfactual, however, relevant (muslim) groups within the immigrant population, do not perceive themselves as part of the lower class, but rather as part of a culture that is strictly religiously shaped. This ideological shift, which has been taking place for a period of more than 40 years, prevents and blocks the emergence of a politically self-confident and reflective immigrant lower class, striving for social upward mobility. At this point at the latest, we can observe that the social problems attached to (im)migration are co-produced in the same way by the host society and the immigrants themselves.

If (!) social work is claiming a political mandate in the field of immigration, it has to base its position on a class analysis. When working with immigrants, social workers have to convey and clarify their insight into the respective clients class position, treating him/her primarily as a citizen, embedded in the legal order of the host country and the cleavages of class conflict as well.

At any rate the socio-political challenge is clear to see: just like the social layers of the lower class, labeled as „social underclass", immigrant households show a high rate of low employment, unemployment, low income, and a low level of formal qualification as well. They are subject to disciplinary measures, constantly referred to precarious jobs, even

based on discriminatory procedures and practices. And besides that, they are increasingly referred to the most expensive segments of the private housing market.

Taking the last three OECD-reports into consideration - namely: „growing unequal" (2009), „A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility" (2018) and „Under Pressure - The Squeezed Middle Class" (2019) - we can see a picture of growing inequality, poverty, and segregation. Within this picture Immigrants always belong(ed) to a considerable extent to the loser groups in the process of mdernisation.

To put it roughly: the unemployment rate of immigrant households is three times as high as the average, the poverty rate of immigrant households is nearly twice the average, migrant early school-leavers or persons leaving the education system after compulsory schooling represent four-fifths of this group. Immigrants live to a significant extent in disadvantaged neighbourhoods with partly bad connections to public transport, with a weak infrastructure and manifest social problems in public space. They belong to the first social groups who fall prey to the „financialisation" of the housing market, to processes of gentrification and, in contrast, to the formation of social hot spots or focal points.

In its most problematic form, parts of the migrant underclass form a parallel society. Here we can observe the ambiguity of the social problem of immigration as if under a burning glass. By any means immigration presupposes the willingness of the host society to socially integrate and include immigrants. At the same time, however, it demands that immigrants submit to the rules of the host society, which is based, as far as capitalist, secular, and at least formally liberal societies are concerned, on a bourgeois social contract, an idea going back to Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Adam Ferguson or Montesquieu. The subject of this contract is to accept the state monopoly on the use of force, to accept the division of powers, to accept fundamental rights, to accept the religious equidistance of the atheistic state, and to obey the rule of law.

The political as well a sociological term „parallel-society", coined by Wilhelm Heitmeyer, is obviously a fuzzy one, and was often misunderstood with demagogic intent. Although captured by right wing political parties in order to use it as an ideological projection on the dangerousness of muslims it actually refers to the self-organisation of parts of an immigrant (ethnic or religious) minority, which do neither comply with the rule of law nor the cultural and moral concepts of the majority society, intending to reduce or minimise their spatial, social and cultural contact with members of the majority society into which they immigrate. However, regularly parallel societies are not identical with ethnic groups.

Indeed, it would be misleading to assume that a parallel society is based on a monocultural identity, a closed economy, and a doubling of the institutions of the state. In fact, even parallel societies are composed of several, often conflicting ethnic groups, consisting out of multifold cultural and religious practices. As a matter of fact, a parallel society is far from being homogenous.

We have to be very clear at this juncture: the problem lies not with self-organisation, but with norm compliance and the lack of connectivity to the rules of the capitalist labour market and the regulatory state as well. The german term „Paralleljustiz" (parallel judicial system) indicates what happens or could happen: immigrants establish informal (religious) rules and law enforcement pertaining to the field of family and childhood law, lwhat happened in canada 1982-2002 for example, when the sharia was applied in divorce proceedings. Women are denied rights in divorce proceedings before a religious official. Domestic violence is justified by reference to cultural practices and religious dictates. Children are denied educational opportunities with reference to patriarchal claims to design and reign the family. Children are married to family members as minors in violation of the applicable marriage and child law. From a legal point of view it is completely irrelevant how many cases there are, because the law´s claim to validity is an absolute one. There can be no exception to the absolute prohibition of violence, which for example forbids chastising children physically or instrumentalising them sexually.

Whatever, the development of a parallel societycan be traced back to a complex bundle of factors. If immigrant networks encapsulate, separate or segregate themselves from the majority of society economically, socially, legally, linguistically and culturally, a parallel society emerges, reducing the level of integration and inclusion. However, this segregation is in most cases triggered by immigrant networks and by public authorities which are not providing proper counselling and assistance to allow immigrants to position themselves socially. In these cases immigrants require (!) social networks established by people from their country of origin in order to to find access to the host society at all.

Therefore Wolfgang Kaschuba´s observation that immigrants do not immigrate into the host society but into a parallel society represents only a part of reality. The retreat of immigrants into a parallel structure is caused by a mixture of social conditions, by striving to create and maintain a (virtual) cultural identity of whatever kind, driven by religious constraints. In this way, an economic conflict is transformed into an ideological-moral one, labeled by Lewis Coser a „unrealistic conflict". Pertaining to the muslim group of immigrants the German Journal APuZ has traced that the level of religiosity is directly linked to the rejection of and the distance to the non-muslim part of the population. But there is no evidence of the emergence of religious ´clan` - structures, apart from criminal (terrorist) groups who claim (!) to be religious (but are not in most cases). However, regarding the equality between men and women at least 50 percent of the muslim population living in Germany reject the idea of equal rights, rule of law, and fundamental rights.

Nevertheless, it is inadmissible to generalize these observations. Taking a closer look immigrants occupy opposite positions within the structure of social strata of European societies. While the bigger part of migrating EU-nationals could be labeled as part of the shrinking „middle class", foreigners from third countries have to start, as already discussed, from the bottom of society. Social work with immigrants is therefore above all taking

place in segregated or disadvantaged neighbourhoods, characterised by precarious life situations, unemployment, poverty, and social isolation.

From the perspective of social and migration law, professional social work is in charge of solving social problems while controlling, governing and empowering their immigrant clients. As in all other fields of social work, the aim here is to understand migrants not from the deficit perspective as victims, but as actors capable of social action who predominantly want to lead an integrated middle class existence, complying with the given legal framework.

Instead of tackling issues like the recognition of religious practices or cultural peculiarities social work should concentrate on adequate housing, language acquisition, healthcare, the recognition of qualifications brought along. It should tackle unemployment and improve the access to the labour market. It should develop measures in order to contain and/or reduce persistent poverty and its heredity. It should combat domestic violence and delinquency. It should reduce school-avoidance and vanquish educational discrimination. In general social work should develop potentials and resources on the client side in a preventative manner.

However, once defined social problems are regularly not only the outcome of ideological disputes but rather result of the conditions and rules of capital appropriation especially when talking about labour immigration. Seen from this angle social work has also to role and obligation to stress within its triple mandate its advocacy, lobbying and intercession in favour of their clientele. In short: when it comes to immigration social work inevitably plays a political role between racist, nationalist and homophobic policies of social control and neoliberal strategies of exploitation.

Obviously the ongoing process of privatisation and marketisation regarding housing, health or education hampers the capability of social administration to steer immigration. Similar pertains to the profession of social work, focusing on socio-economic aspects. Obviously patterns, discourses and results of right wing policies block the access to citizenship, employment chances, decent housing, education, or healthcare provision. Discriminatory, often racist practices prevail.

However, social work is in a dilemmatic way part of this political project and ideological frame, being an instrument of/for social services provided by Social Profit Organisations which are commissioned by the public authorities. Precisely for this reason social work should, instead of joining the predominant discourse, which decodes immigration in Europa as a religious or cultural problem, develop suitable instruments of social engineering. Social work professional should see very clearly, that the discourse on identity policies is a double edged sword, echoing, at least as Austria is concerned, right-wing populist ideas of a „lead culture" or a diffuse national identity based on eating pork-meat, hearing incredibly under-complex 4/4-rhythm-music, dressing up in parliament like hunters and

peasants/farmers living in the mountains, or binge-drinking at the „Oktober-Fest" in Vienna in „Dirndl" (traditional costume) and leather trouser.

However, there is no identity of a nation or a people at all, if there ever had been one. Instead, modern societies are characterized by hybrid social structures, immigration and emigration, growing social inequality and cultural diversity. The same applies to immigrants who constantly celebrate their identity through the reproduction of cultural patterns pertaining to their country of origin and their distinct religious practices.

Based on the idea of „identity" as a mode of demarcation, immigration policies suddenly appear as identity policies. We should see clearly by contrast that identity policies are the breeding ground for social de-solidarisation, segregation, and the dismantling of the welfare state. Social inclusion will not be possible by advocating a special legal position, but by enabling acculturation and assimilation through equal opportunities and participation, rooted in the concept of citizenship. If political elites are engaging in inter-religious dialogues in order to cope with the consequences of migration, social work should counter that the integration and inclusion of immirgants are about equality policies combatting discriminatory practices, about an access to community housing and labour market participation, affordable training and education, and above all, an easier access to citizenship.

1.3. Who is a Refugee ?

Irregular immigration into Europe seems unstoppable at the moment, although the numbers are decreasing significantly. Nevertheless, we should not misjudge the underlying problem, talking about the blurry demarcation line between labour migration and forced migration: Step by step the definition of a „refugee" according to the Geneva Convention on Refugees looses its practical applicability. Persecution based on gender, political, religious or ethnic reasons can no longer be decoupled from ecological disasters and economic exclusion.

The Syrian civil war has been the first war ignited by drought and the lack of water in a society shaped by agriculture. More than 150 Million people are seeking shelter from natural disaster worldwide. There is no technical legal instrument at hand to tackle that. Unequal terms of trade and imperialistic practices have robbed millions of people of their economic livelihoods as can easily be understood after a closer look at the agricultural production conditions in Africa compared to the subsidised agricultural exports of the EU to Africa.

On the one hand this makes clear that the distinction between labour migration and refugee migration has become already meaningless. About half of all refugees reaching the coast of Europe try to escape from precarious economic conditions. On the other hand it seems to be a simple decisionat least for the EU political class to allow for the development of sustainable regional economic cycles, growth, and employment opportunities in the emigration countries.

Migration policies of the European Union are at the same time focusing on the containment of illegal or irregular immigration, repatriation agreements, enforced deportation, while asylum law and the asylum regime will be harmonised throughout Europe, carrying out asylum procedures on african soil, stopping forced migration already in Turkey by paying the Erdogan - regime another 6 billion Euros. Accordingly, 2016 forced migration via Turkey, the Balkans, Russia was significantly reduced. 2017 all Mediterranean routes had been practically closed. Moreover, since 2017 the number of recognised asylum seekers is shrinking drastically in Germany, Sweden, England and Austria - the countries which took the majority of refugees during the crisis 2015-2016.

In 2017 only 46 percent of all asylum applications in the European Union received a positive response. More than half of the asylum-seekers were labeled as illegal labour migrants. In 2018 Germany, the country which took most of the refugees, only 27.3 percent of all applicants were granted full refugee cover. 16.6 percent were granted subsidiary protection and 6.3 percent were labeled as illegal but granted a temporary deportation ban. However, only a small portion of those labeled illegal have been in fact deported to their countries of origin. Two-thirds of the rejected asylum-seekers were not deported back to their country of origin. A system of repatriation agreements is still missing. People rejected often submerge and offer their labour force on the informal market.

1.4. Only productive immigrants allowed

Evidently the rationale of a capitalist society while admitting migrants is misunderstood. Every migrant worker, including those who fake a reason for asylum, is subject to competitive conditions. This also applies to an asylum seeker who has acquired the desired legal status; not to mention the fact that under the Geneva Convention, asylum always grants temporary residence status.

Immigration should be understood as a mode of regulating the capitalist economy. Refugee migration is a dysfunctional element in this context. Therefore the political class tries to counterbalance the dynamics of the two types of migration, that is to say: labour migration and forced migration or displacement. While avoiding or containing the immigration of low-skilled workers, it tries to instrumentalise forced migration as a resource and labour market reserve in order to cover deficits, gaps and unmet demand in the labour market. The countries from which very poorly qualified immigrants come are then suddenly regarded as safe, as is the case in Afghanistan, for example. The opposite is true for Iran or Venezuela. My assumption is that there is a covert economic calculation in dealing with refugee migrants. Accordingly, the immigration regime (and its legal architecture) allows for an arbitrary decision between proven and pretended persecution, betweeen safe and insecure third countries, between legal and illegal immigration. This policy is already very effective. On the long run we can trace that labour migration from third-country nationals to the EU is stagnating, while the EU´s focus is on highly qualified people. The legal immigration of unskilled workers to Europe is meanwhile largely prevented.

Meanwhile, the social and political cost of immigration policy as „non social policy" (Didier Fouarge) is increasing. Until 2017 most of the asylum seekers in Europe came from Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. This mobility pattern evoked massive fear of the possible emergence of an islamic subculture on European soil. Representatives of muslim interest groups did nearly everything to foster this impression, although they do by far not represent a relevant share of those immigrating from Muslim societies. About 67% of the population believe that Muslims are a threat to internal security and a provocation to European lifestyles.

This paradox political symbiosis between right-wing politicians and muslim representatives is, taking a closer look, contrasted by studies like the German SINUS, which revealed that 28 percent of the regular immigrants could be labeled as pragmatic, integrated and adaptive-bourgeois, 24 percent could be labeled as a bi-cultural, assimilated performer-milieu, identifying with capitalist economics, liberal democracy and a self-determined, post-religious lifestyle. Another 26 percent are labeled as conservative and 22 percent as religious extremist (or fascist).

In view of these data we should note that forced migration is just a reaction on political and economic crises. In the first half of 2019 more than a quarter of all asylum applications were submitted by mainly catholic citizens from Venezuela, Columbia, Georgia and Albania. This will shift the focus of immigration once again.

As a result the demarcation between labour migration and forced migration becomes blurry step by step. Apart from that, we observe the emergence of a structural mismatch on the labour market because of inappropriate or low qualifications that immigrants bring with them. An easier access to the labour market through improved „nostrification" - rules could only partially solves the problem. While the lions share of EU-nationals migrating in between the member states as migrant workers is inserted into the labour market, segments of the refugee-population, parts of the second or third generation of foreign guest workers, and the descendants of the post-colonial re-migration still represent problematic groups in the labour market.

1.5. The Challenge of Social Inclusion

The chances for social inclusion of migrants are diminished by the fact that the ongoing rush of comparatively poorly qualified workers in search of a middle class existence is counteracted by the EU's policies. EU competition policy and modernisation strategies focus on the development of a qualified workforce embedded in a knowledge based society. Obviously, a considerable proportion of immigrants do not correspond to this picture. It is precisely this aspect that explains why economic reasons are often brought into play in the asylum process. And it is obvious that unqualified people do not receive a blue card or a nation state equivalent.

1.5.1. Shifts in the Labour Market

We cannot detach this development from the structural shift on the labour market itself. Indeed, since the 1950es we saw remarkable changes in the job profiles demanded in the labour markets of industrialised countries. Back in the „fordist" accumulation regime during the 1960es it was sufficient for a migrant manual labourer to carry out standardised work steps; whereas since the 1990es the labour market addressing unskilled and semi-skilled labour is shrinking constantly. Consequential industrialised economies have tried to reduce the number of poorly qualified immigrant workers by terminating the recruitment agreements. Of course the expectations were not met: the recruited workers did not move back; instead, they arranged for their families to join them in the countries of employment, importing partly dysfunctional elements like the housewife-marriage or arranged marriages, conflicting with youth welfare law.

In the wake of a partially or fully automated working environment, labelled as „digital work" and „rise of the human-robot-link" once again job-profiles are changing. Employers ask for multilingual, inter-culturally competent employees with technical, social and entrepreneurial skills. This paradigm is mirrored in highly selective immigration policies developed in the Anglo-Saxon world and the transnational competition for best brains.

As a result all over Europe the unemployment- and poverty-rates of the immigrant population are not only still significantly above the average but are higher than ever.

1.5.2. Refugee Crisis and Labour Market

The refugee crisis has exacerbated this contradiction. Regarding people being recognised as refugees, we observe structural problems and substantial obstacles pertaining to the access to the formal labour market. An Austrian example may be provided here: from the group of people who had been granted asylum or subsidiary protection in 2015 at least 30 percent have been employed or self-employed in 2018; 49 percent were still unemployed and 21 percent were due to several reasons not capable of gainful employment. Studies carried out the OECD show a similar picture: in the average 50% of all recognised refugees are unemployed after a period of six years.

The rest is just prognosis, for example, when it is claimed that in 2030-2035 more than half of all immigrant women will be employed.

The initial situation is seemingly difficult, because the access to the labour market depends on the class position in the country of origin, the acquired formal qualification, cultural and religious patterns, the permeability of the labour market, the willingness of employers and so on.

1.5.3. Factors Enhancing and Impeding Labour Market Participation

In order to give a positive example we can learn from the social integration and inclusion of refugees fleeing in the years 1990-1993 from the civil war in Bosnia to Germany, Switzerland and Austria triggered by the Austrian recognition of the Slovenian secession from Yugoslavia. These people were within 1-2 years formally integrated in the systems of social security, socially included, and showed a high employment rate. The reasons for this kind of success story lie above all in the already in their country of origin acquired formal qualification, in the compatibility of cultural practices, in the quite pragmatic handling of religious rules, the readiness of women to take part in the labour market and the willingness to embark on further training and education. In short: it was the readiness and ability to assimilate which provided them smooth access to all relevant markets.

Against that background we have also to take into account that out of the Iraqi, Syrian, Afghan people who fled to Germany, Sweden und Austria nearly 60% of all citizens from Iraq had completed secondary education while 80% of all persons from Afghanistan were limited to compulsory education. However, 80 percent of children and juvenile in Afghanistan do not visit elementary school at all. Moreover, formal certificates are not comparable. Measured by the formal level of language competence and command in Austrian elementary school 90% of Afghan citizens failed the educational objective: they were practically illiterate.

This initial situation is translating into the labour market. In Austria the unemployment rate of immigrants mounts up to 13.5 percent compared to 9.1 percent in the average. The unemployment rate of citizens of EU member states is with 8.1 percent significantly lower than the average, while people from Russia (36,6%), Afghanistan (46,4%) or Syria (74,7%) show significantly higher numbers. Regularly people registered as unemployed have a secure residence status as recognised refugee or eligible for subsidiary protection. This is due to a low formal level of education and a lack of recognition of educational qualifications acquired abroad.

1.6. Immigration: Social Question and Social problem

Seen from a perspective of social stratification the social problem with immigration lies, apart from others factors, with the fact, that the profit, which is drawn from cheap, informal, often illegal migrant labour, is privately appropriated, while the social cost of immigration is socialised.

1.6.1. Manufacturing anti-immigrant consent

In order to cover that up the neoliberal media-machine manufacturing political consent and prejudice labels immigrants as culturally inappropriate, intending to hide the economic determinants. Part of this projection is a grotesque exaggeration of the social and economic problems attached to the migrant population. While the majority of the popula-

tion believes that immigrants would immigrate into social security systems without properly contributing fiscal analysis shows that immigrants who take part in the labour market pay more into the social security system than they can take from it.

Similarly, the population of the member states believes that the proportion of immigrants is twice as high as in reality. Crime statistics reporting the delinquency of immigrant do not distinguish between resident and non-resident foreigners. Focusing on resident immigrants only it becomes clear that foreigners are more law-abiding than their domestic counterparts.

Starting from Bourdieus ´Misere du Monde` we can trace that the intricate formation of ´parallel societies` is, as a result of exploitation, segregation and insulation, regularly culturally and ideologically legitimised. At the end one can observe people living in a segregated area in the destination country not being able to communicate or exchange with citizens and/or the local population. This will be dramatised on the one hand; on the other hand the rules of the market, their own reactions on exclusion and the loss of citizenship, identity and recognition doesn't let them choose.

The reasons for that are obvious. Enterprises are interested in cheap labour on flexible labour markets while labour unions are interested in policies combating and avoiding wage dumping practices. The dynamic of social relegations, the shrinking of the middle classes and the end of social upward mobility are used by right-wing, often fascist movements and political parties to label immigration ostensively as the allegedly real cause of why the middle class has come under pressure. The media dramatise individual cases.

1.6.2. Perspectives on Class

This leads to the question how we could design a model capable of explaining the distribution of social problems attached to migration.

As a result the migrant population falls into three groups: migrants make up a large part of the lower class or „social underclass"; a small fraction is part of the shrinking middle classes in Europe; and a tiny part can be assigned to the upper middle layer and upper layer.

Quite consistent the social problems emerging in the immigrant population are social problems typical of the lower classes, when it comes to poverty, unemployment, precarious housing, missing or insufficient education. Using Pierre Bourdieu´s model of different sorts of capital, that means: economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital, a picture emerges revealing a low level of social inclusion, of social mobility and of social participation. Instead, we observe dynamics of spatial and social segregation, subcultural isolation, and the evolution of the already mentioned „parallel societies".

Determinants and intervening factors within that social development are undoubtedly complex. Migrant networks are partially necessary to settle in the destination country.

They are conducive to the development of resilience. They provide social capital. But at the same time they may be detrimental for the chances of social integration and inclusion. They keep the labour force in informal employment.

Immigrants often live in disadvantaged neighbourhoods because of financial speculation on the deregulated private housing market. But at the same time we observe social practices of self-insulation on the housing market, migrants renting their condominium only to migrants of the same ethnicity.

Even if migrant groups in need of social work represent only a small proportion of the entire migrant population, we can stress, that the question of immigration is above all identical with the social question. Social, cultural or religious conflicts are essentially an expression of social inequality and missing social equity. The self-closure of immigrants is mirroring the dynamics of structural social exclusion.

As a matter of fact the picture of social problems attached to migration processes in Europe is quite heterogenous. But even here we can learn from distribution and geography of social problems. Taking a comparative look on Europe all in all 7.8 percent of the population living in Member States of the European Union are foreign nationals.

However, a given percentage of immigration does not indicate a respective share of social problems. The highest share of foreign citizens can be found in Luxembourg (47.8 percent; Cyprus (17.8 percent), Austria (15.7 percent) and Estland (14.9 percent). Remarkably these countries are characterised by a relative low level of violent conflicts involving immigrants.

Obviously the complex interaction of a given migration regime, a historical legacy of colonialism, labour migration or the specific structure of the labour market is reflected in the composite of social problems attached to migration.

On the other hand the Member States associated with social problems caused by immigration show a significantly lower percentage of migrants: Germany (11.7 percent), Spain (9.8 percent), Great Britain (9.5 percent), Sweden (8,7 percent) and France (7.0 Percent). These social problems are described by the emergence of a economically, socially and culturally decoupled „parallel society".

2. Migration Policy in Europe

Social Work has to take into account, that the prevailing approach to regulate immigration to Europe is, as already discussed, based on a strict utility calculation. From the EU-Blue Card which was designed to attract highly qualified third-country nationals over regulations steering selectively the access to national labour markets down to the blockade of migration routes the European Union is trying to prevent the access of low skilled workers.

Substantially, the migration regime is based on the interest to attract and keep a productive workforce coping with the requirements in the working environments of the capitalist industry 4.0. Taking a look at the Europe 2020 with its five headline targets designed to boost growth and employment the functional role of immigration is discernible.

All legal instruments and political measures to steer and manage immigration should be read against the background of a targeted employment rate of the population aged 20–64 from 69% to at least 75% between 2010 and 2020. The European Union intends to reduce the share of early school leavers to 10% from 15% in 2010. It intends to increase the share of the population aged 30–34 having completed tertiary education from 31% to at least 40%.

The Commission´s Strategy is based on four policy areas:

1. Reducing incentives for irregular migration

2. Securing external borders and saving lives

3. Establishing a common asylum policy

4. Developing a new policy on legal immigration

It is illuminating to take a closer look at this:

ad 1.: The attempt to reduce illegal or irregular immigration is based on the analysis that migrant smuggling is a criminal activity. Poverty, social and political instability, as well as the limited availability of legal migration routes, push people towards criminal networks to facilitate their unauthorised entry into, transit through or stay in the EU. The Commission is aware that smugglers frequently expose migrants to both life-threatening risks and violence. Since 2002 the EU is tackling irregular migration, elaborating a penal framework on the prosecution of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, focusing on the prevention of any exploitation of migrants by criminal networks and the reduction of incentives for irregular migration. Analysis shows that migrants continue to depend on criminals after they have arrived in the EU. Criminal networks can facilitate irregular residence, including through the production and supply of counterfeit documents. Irregular migrants are perceived to be vulnerable to exploitation. Therefore employers who employ irregular migrants are appropriately sanctioned.

Most irregular migrants originally entered the EU legally on short-stay visas, but remain in the EU for economic reasons once their visa has expired. The EU has therefore developed an integrated border management strategy by using information technology and biometric features for identification.

The EU aims at an effective return policy based on the Return Directive including common standards and procedures for the return of non-EU nationals who are staying in the EU irregularly. The Commission has been formally authorised to negotiate EU readmission agreements with more than 30 countries.

Since 1999, the EU has been working to create a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and improve the current legislative framework. Several legislative measures harmonising common minimum standards for asylum were adopted.

Ad 4.: But the most exiting part is the concept for legal migration and integration. In fact the policy aims to establish a framework for legal migration does not take the mode integration and inclusion into the host societies into account. Instead, the EU measures on legal immigration just cover the formal conditions of entry and residence for certain categories of immigrants, such as highly qualified workers.

Although the EU approach to migration addresses the issue of integration, the strategy is lacking the answer to the question „how ?" to do that. It states, that successful integration of migrants into their host society is essential to maximise the opportunities afforded by legal migration and to realise the potential that immigration has for EU development.

A sustainable policy approach to the management of migration is not discernible. The strategy intends to curb irregular migration through specific measures targeting employers who hire undeclared migrant workers, by setting up a effective return policy in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and by repressing human trafficking networks. But the actual problem of giving immigrants a perspective for social advancement remains unresolved.

How purposeful is that ? When it comes to the prevention of irregular immigration the answer is „yes, very". When it comes to the agenda of social inclusion the commission proves to be an extended arm of companies that are interested in cheap but well-qualified work.

3. Migration Outlook

Nevertheless, the question remains, in which way the framework conditions under which the strategy of a fortress europe against irregular immigration is to be implemented will be stable or subject to social change.

3.1. Global Perspective

The International Migration Report from 2017 revealed that the number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in recent years. It increased from 173 Million in 2000 up to 258 Million in 2017.

At the same time the number of refugees mounted up to 70,8 Million in the end of 2018. Compared to 2012 (45,2) this represents an increase of nearly 57%. Today 27% of all migrants worldwide are refugees. This number includes people seeking asylum and already recognised asylum seekers.

Over 60 percent of all international migrants lived 2018 in Asia (80 Million) or Europe (78 Million) including Non-Eu-States like Norway, Turkey or parts of Russia. Northern America

hosted the third largest number of international migrants (58 Million), followed by Africa (25 Million), Latin America and the Caribbean (10 Million) and Oceania (8 Million).

In 2017, two thirds (67 per cent) of all international migrants were living in just twenty countries. The largest number of international migrants (50 million) resided in the United States of America. Saudi Arabia, Germany and the Russian Federation hosted the second, third and fourth largest numbers of migrants worldwide (around 12 million each), followed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (nearly 9 million).

In 2016, the total number of refugees and asylum seekers in the world was estimated at 25.9 million. Turkey hosted the largest refugee population worldwide, with 3.1 million refugees and asylum seekers, followed by Jordan (2.9 million), the State of Palestine (2.2 million), Lebanon (1.6 million) and Pakistan (1.4 million).

Climate change will modify the conditions of migration policy making drastically. Studies from the Munich University or the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research show that another Billion people will be on their way, fleeing from storms, drought, inundations, erosion and social conflicts ignited by ecological disaster. But most of them will either migrate within their country of origin or move to a neighboring country. Only a small portion will move transnationally to Europe or US.

How and where to migrants will move is above all a political decision regarding the development of sustainable development and growth and the processing of the consequences of environmental disasters as well.

3.2. European Perspective

Therefore the narrative of a continuing wave of uncontrolled muslim immigration and the fascist propaganda of a European population exchange is pure nonsense. Not even a tenth of the European population mounting up to 741 Million was in 2018 either immigrant or a person with migration background.

Broken down to the European Union with its 512 Million inhabitants we saw 22 Million third-country nationals living in the EU in 2017 according to Eurostat. This corresponded to a percentage of 4.3%.

Moreover, Europe is returning back to normal after the migration crisis of 2015. Between 2010 and 2013, around 1.4 million non-EU nationals, excluding asylum seekers and refugees arrived in the EU each year, with a slight decrease after 2010. 2015/2016 irregular immigration exploded due to the US - wars in Afghanistan, Syria and Irak. In 2014, 283,532 migrants irregularly entered the European Union. 2015 1 Million migrants and refugees arrived in Europe. 2017 had already dropped to 560.000.

To give a differentiated picture a total of 4.4 million people immigrated to one of the EU-28 Member States during 2017. Among these 4.4 million immigrants during 2017, there were an estimated

- 2.0 million citizens of non-EU countries,

- 1.3 million people with citizenship of a different EU Member State from the one to which they immigrated,

- around 1.0 million people „returning nationals" (persons who migrated to an EU Member State of which they had the citizenship already)

- 11 thousand stateless people.

During the same year 3.1 million emigrants were reported to have left an EU Member State. Each year 0.8 - 0.9 Million people receive the citizenship of one of the Member States.

A few more remarks are required here:

• Women comprise slightly less than half of all international migrants. The share of female migrants fell from 49 percent in 2000 to 48 percent in 2017. Female migrants outnumber male migrants in Europe

• Northern America, Oceania and Latin America and the Caribbean, while in Africa and Asia, particularly Western Asia, migrants are predominantly men.

• In 2017, the median age of international migrants worldwide was 39 years, a slight increase from 38 years in 2000. Yet in some regions, the migrant population is becoming younger. Between 2000 and 2017, the median age of international migrants declined in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania.

What is to expected in the light of these developments ?

4. Social Work in a Migration Society

Social work with migrants in a migration society means mainly working with low-skilled (legal and illegal) migration workers in formal and informal employment, and refugees, regarding their specific conditions regarding language, culture, tradition, religion, but also their trauma, health status, and precarious life situation in and after the asylum procedure.

4.1. Requirements of Social Work

If social work is stressing its political mandate it should embed the issue of immigration in a transformative, inclusive perspective, based also on the analysis of exploitation, marketisation, financialisation, class, not only on race and culture. This includes a deep understanding of the reasons for and functions of migration

Obviously migration indicates a complex relation. It is influenced by a combination of economic, environmental, political and social factors. Push-Factors in the country of origin and Pull-Factors in the country of arrival are mingling. Migration is not only consisting out of many forms - seasonal, circular, serial or chain migration -, it is also consisting out

of different social layers, generating different impact on the countries of origin and the host countries of migration.

The dynamic of legalisation in the field of migration is enormous. Therefore the networking of social work with other professions is of paramount importance.

4.2. Challenges of Social Work

As soon as they have been offered a sustainable perspective of remaining clients have to be prepared to cope with the requirements of neoliberal labour markets, which are characterised by flexibility, atypical work, and growing demands on the workforce while the numbers of working poor and of employees receiving low wages are constantly increasing.

But social work has also to prepare for repatriation or return migration. As the practice and procedure of return counselling shows, one of the main tasks of social work is to open up economic perspectives for refugees after a negative outcome of the asylum procedure.

4.3. Limitations of Social Work

At the same time we observe a demanding challenge to the resources and capabilities of social work. In fact we can enumerate a series of intractable social problems conntected to immigration pertaining to age, gender, tradition, values, attitudes and cultural habits, religion and citizenship, which that overload and overtax the entire welfare state system.

At that point we can discern functional limitations to the management of immigration not only within the given context of modern, neoliberal labour markets. Under similar conditions the educational system, the healthcare system, the housing market, and the welfare state are put under pressure. A dividing line between public and private schools has already been established, deciding upon social upward and downward mobility. In most of the European member states the healthcare system is already restricted to base supply while the volume of retentions and the number of service and benefit exclusions is expanding. On the housing market 40 years of the expansion of capitalist accumulation into new territories of real estate together with policies of privatisation have left the lower 25% without access to affordable housing. The welfare state is step by step characterised by benefit cuts and „poor services for the poor".

These are the conditions, within which social work with immigrants has to be carried out. From the perspective of social work, characterised by limited resources and success-based systems in service contracts, affected by the effects of erratic austerity policies and the pervasive administrative focus on disciplinary social and restrictive budget control, limits of feasibility appear on the horizon.

These limitations are partly based on objective criteria, partly based on discretionary political decisions. They can only be eliminated if fundamental redistributive policy decisions are taken. But corresponding political majorities are not in sight.

4.4. Social Work and the Ideology of ‚Culture` in Migration

At this point we must finally once again turn our attention for a short time to the quite fuzzy discourse on multiculturalism and social work, because the discourse on migration management and social work as part of it is overshadowed by the idea of a dominant culture, a culture of the majority, leading to the notion of „Leitkultur". Opposite to this mainstream-culture the media observe immigrant subcultures, regularly identified by religion, problematic cultural practices. It is a matter of fact that behavioural patterns labeled as „social problems" attached to immigration processes are regularly caused by cultural distinctions and religious practices.

When it comes to the „religion" and migration, we have to understand that the model of the European nation state is in its core wicked, godless or atheistic. Religion resorts to the civil society while the state is a technical instrument of governance. Fundamental rights enshrine the subjective right to be religious, to carry out religious practices in the legal form of different religious bodies and churches. They do not justify an exemption of civic duties and obligations regarding school attendance, domestic violence, or violence perpetrated against children. By the same token the freedom fo religion does not override rights on equality, self-determination or the right to establish a family according to his or her own preferences. At this juncture we observe a fundamental misunderstanding within the multiculturalist discourse and a challenge for social work: a prerequisite of social work is to understand the cultural and ideological background of clients. However, its normative goal is to coproduce conditions in which citizens can be able to lead an autonomous, self-determined and self-reliant life within a given legal framework of rights and duties attached to citizenship, a given capitalist market-economy and a given distinction between the realms of the private and the public sphere.